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I. INTRODUCTION
The system of the Mixed Courts of Egypt was an unusual institution.
It represented an international solution in the context of what was
obviously a colonial situation.' The system lasted 74 years from 1876
to 1949.
A system of law was established whose sources were general codes
created especially for use by the Mixed Courts. The Charter of the
Mixed Courts specified two residual sources of law. It is these sources
and their application upon which this paper is principally focused. Arti-
cle 34 reads:
The new Courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction in civil and
commercial matters, and within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred
upon them in penal matters, shall apply the codes presented by Egypt
to the Powers, and in case of silence, insufficiency, and obscurity of
the law, the judge shall follow the principles of natural law and equity.
The language of the Charter was incorporated into article 11 of the
Mixed Civil Code of Egypt which stated: "In case of silence, insuffi-
ciency, or obscurity of the law, the judge shall apply the principles of
natural law and the rules of equity."' Such a provision does not appear
to have a counterpart in other modern legal systems. Neither the Swiss
Civil Code3 nor any other European code permits the judge to make
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia. B.A., William and Mary, 1959: D.P.A.,
University of Exeter (England), 1960; LL.B. 1963, LL.M. 1965, Columbia. The author has trans-
lated, from the French and the Italian, all passages quoted from the judgments of the Mixed Courts
and from Judge Messina's treatise.
Of course, the circumstances under which the Mixed Courts system operated are unlikely to
be repeated; it is certain that the imposition, by external pressures, of a separate system of law
and judicial tribunals to deal with disputes with foreigners is not desirable. Had there been no
mixed system, Egyptian law, including its rules on conflict of laws, would have been applied. The
Mixed Codes and the rules of law set forth in the Charter were thus far more than an attempt to
harmonize divergent legal systems in order to avoid choice of law problems under Egyptian law.
The mixed legal system was a substitute for the Egyptian legal system and reflected fears that still
plague the international community today. These fears include a lack of confidence in the laws of
particular legal systems and suspicion as to the capability and impartiality of the national judge.
I"En cas de silence d'insuffisance ou d'obscurit6 de la loi, le juge se conformera aux principes
du droit naturel et aux r~gles de l'6quit6." LES CODES MIXTES D'EGYPTE (U. Pace ed. 1932).
Section 1 of the Civil Code of Switzerland states:
The Law must be applied in all cases which come within the letter or the spirit of any
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use of these sources of law as the entire basis for a judgment.
The discussion of the application of article 34 of the Charter and
article 11 of the Mixed Civil Code will be preceded by a description of
the origins of the system of the Mixed Courts, of their jurisdiction and
organization, of the background of the Mixed Codes, and of their con-
tent. The Mixed Courts operated under the original Charter from 1876
to 1937. The revision of the Charter in 1937, in preparation for the
termination of the Mixed Courts which was to take place 12 years later,
did not affect article 11 of the Civil Code. Article 52 of the revised
Charter reaffirmed the use of natural law and equity in the same terms
as article 34 of the original Charter.
Whatever conclusions can be drawn from the use of natural law and
equity by the Mixed Courts, the technique itself merits the attention of
the jurisprude, the comparativist, and the expert in international law
and transnational transactions.
II. THE MIXED COURTS SYSTEM
A. Origins of the Mixed Courts System
The European powers had long enjoyed special privileges in Egypt
when, in the 1860's and early 1870's, the abuses of the existing system
gave way before the reforms inspired by a number of dedicated and
talented men, the foremost of whom, Nubar Pasha, is considered to be
the founder of the Egyptian system of Mixed Courts.'
The bases of the peculiar position of foreigners in Egypt were a series
of treaties (or capitulations)' which from the 16th century on, had been
negotiated with various foreign powers. This system was characterized
of its provisions. Where no provision is applicable, the judge shall decide according to
the existing Customary Law and, in default thereof, according to the rules which he
would lay down if he had himself to act as legislator. Herein -he must be guided by
approved legal doctrine and case law.
I. WILLIAMS, THE SOURCES OF LAW IN SWISS CIVIL CODE 22 (1923). It is interesting to note that
the Mixed Court of Egypt expressly refused to follow this line of thinking in applying article I I of
the Civil Code to fill a gap in the law. See the Judgment of January 4, 1923, infra notes 93-94 and
the accompanying text for a case where the Court refused to act as legislator.
4 See J. BRINTON, THE MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as J.
BRINTON].
I The term "capitulation" came from the chapters or capitula which contained the various
privileges granted. The first of these agreements was negotiated by the Ottoman Empire with the
merchant cities of France and Italy, such as Genoa, Venice, Pisa, and Marseilles. They guaranteed
freedom of commerce and religion for their citizens within the Ottoman Empire. The powers also
gained the right to appoint consuls who would settle cases, both civil and criminal, between their
citizens. See G. DE HERREROS, TRIBUNAUX MIXTES D'EGYPTE 1-22 (1914) [hereinafter cited as G.
DE HERREROS].
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in the 19th century by two sets of privileges which embraced all immuni-
ties granted to foreigners. These privileges were as follows:
a. Jurisdictional immunity freed the foreigner from the juris-
diction of all but the courts of his own country. This was true
absolutely in criminal matters, but only partially so in civil mat-
ters, since the maxim actor sequitur forum rei was followed.
Thus, the foreigner could never become a defendant in any court
but his own.
b. Legislative immunity was also enjoyed by the foreigner.
Since the foreigner was subject only to his own courts, Egyptian
legislation was not likely to be applied.'
The harmful consequences of such a system are quite apparent. There
was much uncertainty regarding every type of legal relationship. In a
case involving defendants of various nationalities, the plaintiff would
have to carry on a number of suits, requiring preparation in several legal
systems. The power of the defendant to counterclaim was also curtailed
since by doing so he would act as plaintiff in the action, defeating the
rule actor sequiturforum rei. Appeals from consular courts were carried
abroad, and thus the successful plaintiff would be forced to defend the
appeal before a foreign court with the difficulties, bother, and expense
inherent in the conduct of a case under such conditions. Even when the
consular court decided in favor of the plaintiff and was willing to enforce
the decision, an assignment by the defendant to a person of another
nationality would work to remove jurisdiction from that particular con-
sul, leaving the plaintiff with the option of either no recovery or of the
institution of a wholly new suit in the court of the assignee. A paralyzing
influence had set in on the legal life of Egypt and a way out of the
problem had to be discovered. 7
In 1867 Nubar Pasha, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of
Egypt, proposed to the Khedive that reforms be instituted, based on
cooperation between Egyptian and foreign powers, with the purpose of
establishing a novel organization of justice for the country.'
After many years of sometimes discouraging negotiations, the 14
capitulatory powers9 agreed to the reforms which were embodied in
the Charter of the Mixed Courts (Rbglement d'Organisation Judi-
' I S. MESSINA, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL EGYPTIEN MIXTE 11 (1927) [hereinafter cited as I S.
MESSINA].
Id. at 11-14.
Id. at 16-18.
The 14 capitulatory powers were: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United
States, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Norway, Holland, Portugal, and Russia.
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ciaire).'° This document, signed in 1875, heralded the creation of the
Mixed Courts of Egypt, which began their operations on February 1,
1876.
The Charter was prepared by an international commission and, with
minor changes, continued to be the basis of the international coopera-
tion that had its practical application in the operations of the Mixed
Courts. It was meant to have a life of 5 years, but it was renewed
periodically until 1921 when, after further negotiations, the powers of
the Mixed Courts were prolonged for an indefinite period." The Charter
was revised in 1937 and was given a final time span of 12 years."
If the Charter served as the foundation for the Mixed Courts, the
Mixed Codes gave them life. The capitulatory privileges were suspended
for the most part and the consular courts functioned to a very limited
extent. With a new system of justice came new rules of law which could
be uniformly applied. Rather than relying on the system of any one
country, the solution was reached whereby a new system of substantive
law was to be established through the use of codes. The process of the
composition of the codes was much more hurried and informal than that
which had accompanied the negotiations leading to the formulation of
the Charter. 3 From the start it had been tacitly conceded that French
law, adapted to the needs of Egypt, was to furnish the foundation for
the legal system within which the new courts would operate. 4
The extremely difficult job of reconciling the provisions of the French
codes with Egyptian law, and with the law of the Mediterranean coun-
tries whose principles had always been used, was given to an advocate
10 For the text of the Charter see J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 232-41.
Id. at 193.
12 The Charter was revised pursuant to the Treaty of Montreux of 1937, which also provided
that the Mixed Courts were to remain in existence until October 24, 1949, at which time the system
was to pass out of existence. The Treaty of Montreux was entitled "Convention Concerning the
Abolition of Capitulations in Egypt." Article II of the Convention stated that the parties agreed
"to the complete abolition in all respects of Capitulations in Egypt." The revised Charter made
certain changes in the structure of the Mixed Courts by strengthening the position of the Egyptian
members. Certain laws which were considered to belong to the capitulatory system were abolished.
The Mixed Codes were reconfirmed. New Egyptian legislation was to be accepted by the Mixed
Courts, after the Egyptian Government had given its assurance that the legislation would not be
"inconsistent with the principles generally adopted in modern legislation." Some limitations were
placed on the scope of jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts with respect to their application of the
principle of "mixed interest," and with respect to their jurisdiction in actions against the
Government. See J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 200-03.
13 1 S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 30 n.l.
4 Judge Messina, a distinguished member of the bench of the Mixed Courts, believed that the
manner in which the codes were drawn up was not an ideal solution. "Nevertheless, the solution
was unmistakably practical." Id. at 22.
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from Alexandria, Maitre Manoury, who was Secretary of the Interna-
tional Commission. In an astonishingly short time he prepared six
codes: civil, commercial, maritime, civil procedure, penal, and criminal
procedure. 5 The circumstances surrounding the writing of these codes
have occasioned some criticism. Judge Messina l" wrote that even if one
recognized Manoury's general competence, practical experience, and
intellectual preparation for such work, the time element involved made
it impossible for him to be thoroughly prepared for such a task. Others,
such as Judge Brinton, 7 disagree with Judge Messina and praise both
Manoury and his work.
B. The Jurisdiction and Organization of the Mixed Courts
The manner of the creation of the Mixed Courts sporadically gave
rise to arguments that the regime had no national roots. Brinton repre-
sents the view of the majority when he describes Nubar Pasha's concep-
tion of the courts which he sought to establish as a national institution:
In this sense then the designation "Mixed Courts" must be under-
stood as contrasted with those "international" courts whose source of
authority is, properly speaking, not a national but a group sovereignty.
The Mixed Courts are national courts, functioning under conditions
fixed by international agreements for the trial not of international but
of "mixed" causes. 8
Three courts of first instance, called district courts, were established:
one at Alexandria, one at Cairo, and one at Mansura. 9 The Court of
Appeals (Cour d'Appel Mixte) was located in Alexandria. The total
number of judges in the 1930's was seventy, 0 of which two-thirds were
drawn from the foreign powers which had signed the Charter; the
remaining one-third were drawn from the Egyptian bench and bar."
1S See LEs CODES MIXTES D'EGYPTE (U. Pace ed. 1932).
" I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 24.
1 J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 86. M. E. Piola Casselli noted in his review of Professor Walton's
study on the Egyptian law on contracts that Professor Walton called attention to 50 instances
where the Egyptian Code showed distinct improvements upon the French Code. Casselli, La
Reforme des Codes Civils Egyptiens, 12 L'EGYPTE CONTEMPORAINE 189 (1921).
IS J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at II. The term "Mixed Courts" should be distinguished from
"international courts," whose source of authority is not national. The raison d'&tre of the Mixed
Courts was the adjudication of "mixed" causes. Id. at 10-1I. For a debate on the nature of the
Mixed Courts see id. at II n.14. For a list of other sets of mixed courts such as those of Iraq,
Lebanon, Palestine, and China see id. at n.13. See Blanchard, De l'application simultanbe sur le
territoire de I'Egypte de lois d'ordre public international manes de souverainetbs differentes,
24 L'EGYPTE CONTEMPORAINE 513 (1933).
This was an important cotton center in the Nile Delta.
Originally there were 32 judges.
21 Appointments were made by the Egyptian Government after recommendations had been given
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Despite the Mixed Courts official status as Egyptian courts,"2 their
composition distinguished them from other judicial systems. Even their
outward appearance was striking:
It is always an interesting experience to visit the Mixed Courts of
Cairo, for they are the most picturesque courts in the world. The court-
rooms are large, well lighted, and attractive. The judges are robed in
gowns of many colors, each according to his country's custom. The
Egyptian judge wears his red fez, the French his round cap, the English
his big wig, the American in black silk robe but with no headcovering
at all. The advocates are all robed, and the spectators more variegated
than the court. The Egyptian city dwellers wear European dress but
with added fez, and there are always rural spectators present who have
native and tribal costumes, long loose robes coming to the feet and
turbans of various hues.
The proceedings are conducted in the French language, all plead-
ings, arguments, and decisions being in that tongue. Most town-
dwelling Egyptians speak French and many of them speak English
also. If now and then a witness appears who knows only the native
Arabic, the Egyptian judge feels quite at home, and many of the for-
eign judges from their long service on this bench are familiar with the
Arabic also. In fact, all the judges are good linguists, all of them
speaking French, and most of them speaking English, Arabic, and
Italian also."
The jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts included the territorial area of
Egypt. Judge Brinton explains that the dominant position of the Mixed
Courts was due to the fact that their subject matter jurisdiction had the
characteristic of drawing to them all litigation of any importance.
In ordinary civil and commercial cases, this jurisdiction covered all
suits between Egyptians and foreigners and between foreigners of
by the powers involved. The Charter, in article 5, stated that "[tihe appointment and choice of
judges shall belong to the Egyptian government ... " The Egyptian judges were governed by
the same rules as applied to local courts. The percentage of -foreign judges was also fixed by the
Charter. However, the distribution of judgeships among the powers was settled by means of
diplomatic negotiations and agreements. Each capitulatory power was to have at least two judges
in the district courts. In filling the other seats the Egyptian Government was not limited to the
capitulatory powers. After 1914 German and Swiss judges were named. Tenure was for life,
insuring the independence of the judiciary. Article 19 of the Charter stated: "The judges who
compose the Court of Appeal and the District Courts, shall be irremovable. This irremovability
shall last only during the five-year period. It shall become definitely established only after the
completion of this trial period." The judges were also financially independent. J. BRINTON, supra
note 4, at 53; G. DE HERREROS, supra note 5, at 43-50.
" Their national status was reinforced by their somewhat abortive legislative role. J. BRINTON,
supra note 4, at 173-83.
23 W. BURDICK, BENCH AND BAR OF OTHER LANDS 495-96 (1939).
24 J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 60-71.
[Vol. 5: 407
MIXED COURTS OF EGYPT
different nationalities, except questions involving personal status. 5 Gen-
erally, questions of family law were left to other tribunals. The Mixed
Courts also had jurisdiction over cases involving land, even if the dispute
was between foreigners of the same nationality.
All foreigners had the privilege of having their claims brought before
the Mixed Courts. It had been argued that only nationals of the states
which had participated in the formation of the Courts might be admitted
before them, and that all other foreigners were amenable to actions
before the native Egyptian courts. The Mixed Courts refused to take
this view. They created the fiction that the capitulatory powers had
contracted for the benefit of all foreign powers, and thus they held that
the Mixed Courts were open to subjects and citizens of all foreign
nations.26 Another such theory was that of the "protected persons"
(protbgs). Under this theory, those foreign powers which had been
successful in persuading some capitulatory power to take them under
its wing would enjoy the use of the Mixed Courts. Switzerland is the
principal example of this class of states.27
According to the text of the Charter, the jurisdiction of the Mixed
Courts was based primarily on the difference of nationality between the
parties to the litigation.3 However, the Courts went considerably be-
.yond the letter of the definition. They affirmed jurisdiction in cases
where "mixed interest" was to be found, although the actual parties to
the suit were both Egyptians. Despite much criticism leveled at them,
the Mixed Courts did not waiver from the principle of the "mixed
interest," and its constant application was a major factor in the spread
of their influence in Egypt.
The Mixed Courts saw themselves as the protectors of foreign inter-
ests and never hesitated to pierce protective veils to discover such inter-
' Id. at 60. The first nationality law in Egypt, promulgated in 1929, was evidently passed to
aid in ending the problem of who was to be classified as a foreigner.
26 Id. at 63-64. It should be noted that World War I did not affect the rights of subjects of the
Central Powers, who continued to enjoy the right to appear before the Mixed Courts. But Soviet
citizens (with whose government Egypt had no diplomatic relations) could not bring a suit before
the Mixed Court.
27 Id.
2 Article 9 of the Charter states:
The Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all litigation in civil and commercial
matters between natives and foreigners and between foreigners of different nationalities,
outside the law of personal status.
They shall have jurisdiction over real estate actions between natives and foreigners or
between foreigners of the same nationality or of different nationalities.
(The second paragraph originally stated: "They shall also have jurisdiction of all real estate actions
between all persons, even those of the same nationality.")
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ests. This attitude is exemplified in corporate law. Private corporations
in Egypt were either foreign corporations, organized under the law of a
foreign country, or corporations of Egyptian nationality, formed under
Egyptian law and holding charters authorized by the Government. By
the application of the theory of "mixed interests," the Mixed Courts
subjected "Egyptian" companies to their jurisdiction. They acted on the
possibility that the stock of every company is, partly at least, in the
hands of foreigners. This possible ownership was deemed sufficient
"mixed interest" to warrant assumption of exclusive jurisdiction, even
in a case involving an "Egyptian" company and purely Egyptian liti-
gants. Thus, all of the largest enterprises in the country, including the
Suez Canal Company, were brought within the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the Mixed Courts.29
In bankruptcy, as well as in the matter of attachments of property in
the hands of third parties, the Mixed Courts exercised jurisdiction. The
device of the "straw man" was widely used. The name of a foreign
person without any real interest in the case was introduced solely to
confer jurisdiction upon the Mixed Courts. It should be noted, however,
that the Mixed Courts were slow to entertain jurisdiction when closely
connected litigation was pending before other courts.30
The cases brought before the Mixed Courts encompassed nearly all
civil and commercial relations extant in the country. Judge Brinton
points out that the "litigation which comes before these courts faithfully
reflects the varied occupations of the people who inhabit the land."',
Since the growing of cotton was the main business enterprise in Egypt,
all types of transactions incident to its cultivation and sale were the
subject of suits. Furthermore, since Egypt was a commercial crossroads,
Egyptian businessmen often litigated in the Mixed Courts. Land formed
the only means of investment for most Egyptians and it was the subject
of much litigation. Mortgages and loans on mortgages accompanied
investment in land. The certainties of title to land were also a constant
source of lawsuits and were made more complicated by the institution
of the wakf, the religious or family trust. Of course, insurance played
a large role in the commercial life of the country, as did shipping.
Corporate law took precedence, quite naturally, over other fields in
terms of the monetary amounts at stake in litigation.32
" J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 65-66.
'Id.
SI Id. at 69-71.
32 Other important areas of law involved were partnerships, patents and trademarks, unfair
competition, torts, and suits against the Government. J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 7 1.
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C. Legal Background for the System
The system of law devised to regulate the myriad interrelationships
within the competence of the Mixed Courts had its roots in Roman law
as adapted by the French. Amos observed that:
Egypt offers an example of the reception of French law by a people
totally alien to Europe in language, religion and social and political
traditions. When . . . Nubar Pasha secured the consent of the Powers
to the institution of the International Courts, it was agreed without
debate that the only possible law with which to equip them was that
of the French Codes.33
The influence of France, both before and during the period of British
domination, is quite obvious. The style of the Mixed Courts evidences
inspiration from the French system of law.
However, the mixed law was not, as Judge Messina points out, the
result of a codification typical of civil law countries, in which customary
law is slowly evolved by the elements constituting the process of legal
development in given surroundings. It was the product of individual
work, hurriedly completed. He stated that "[tihe Mixed Law was born
at a particular place and time, officially established with bureaucratic
precision. ' '34 In addition, mixed law "is an adaptation which is some-
times ingenious, more often very cursory, rather frequently incomplete
of the European Codes of the French type, that the compiler who was
very hurried simply reproduced, introducing slight modifications and
sometimes mutilating them without reason. 35 Thus, "the truth is that
the Mixed System is not the result of the arbitrary and haphazard
importation of a body of foreign laws into the legal philosophy of the
Moslem society whose relationships it was meant to regulate. ' 3 It is
significant that in Judge Messina's time the Mixed Courts enjoyed the
confidence of the people. One might say, therefore, that the Mixed
Courts drew their authority not from an artificial legislative import but
from "an intimate relationship between its provisions and the feeling of
the people. '37
3 Amos, The Code Napokon and the Modern World, 10 J. CoMP. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.)
222, 235 (1928).
3' I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 25.
I ld. at 26.
30 Id. at 27.
3' Id. at 28. Judge Messina cites Bey, La confiance des gyptiens dans les Tribunaux Mixtes,
in LIVRE D'OR AU CINQUANTENAIRE DES TRIBUNAUX MIXTES (1920), which is not available to the
author.
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D. The Codes of the Mixed Courts
The Civil Code of the Mixed Courts system contained 774 articles
and was divided into four books: property, obligations, various types of
contracts, and debtor-creditor law. It is interesting to note that without
counting the articles on personal status, the number of articles was
about half the number of those found in the French and Italian codes.
This seems to indicate that the Code was a summary of the subject
matter.38 In 1904 Armijon stated that "in formulating a summary of
the French codes, the Egyptian legislator seemed not to have taken
account of the laws, ordinances and decrees which completed, clarified
and corrected these works and whose classification under diverse sub-
jects resulted in forming real codes." 9
The Commercial Code contained 427 articles, contrasted with the 648
articles of its French counterpart. The disparity has been explained as
being caused by the existence of a separate Code of Maritime Com-
merce. The Commercial Code drew the all-important distinction be-
tween commercial and civil matters.40 The most elaborate of the Mixed
Codes was the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure which con-
tained some 800 articles covering every aspect of procedure, pleading,
and proof. The Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Investigation were
promulgated in the hope that they would soon be implemented. That
wish was never fulfilled to any significant extent; the consular courts
retained jurisdiction over criminal matters.4'
The preliminary provisions of the Civil Code, articles 1-14, were
addressed to the civil law and constituted a general preamble to the
whole of the mixed law. These provisions declared the basic principles
which were to be common to civil, commercial, maritime, and criminal
law, as well as to the law governing procedure. 2 It has also been ob-
served that these preliminary provisions have the effect of binding treaty
provisions since they are actually almost identical with articles of the
Charter."
The formal sources of mixed law were la loi and la coutume. Law (loi)
consisted of the codes and also of the legislation of the Egyptian
Government. The laws, ordinances, and orders of the Egyptian execu-
3' 1 S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 33.
31 P. ARMIJON, LE CODE CIVIL ET LEGYPTE, as quoted in I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 33.
" The Commercial Code covered such subjects as commercial contracts and papers, partner-
ships, corporations, and bankruptcy.
41 J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 123.
42 I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 35-36.
13 Id. at 37 n.1.
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tive and legislature, as long as not inconsistent with capitulatory rights,
were enforced by the Mixed Courts. Approval by the powers was
necessary for their application to foreigners but Judge Brinton points
out that many areas of strictly internal administration were governed
by the enactments of the Egyptian legislature without any interference
from the powers."
Coutume, or usage, was the second formal source of mixed law.45 It
is an element which played an extraordinarily large role in regulating
the relations of peoples in Moslem countries. The Mixed Codes them-
selves contained many references to it. The decisions of the courts were
filled with references to usage in every field but particularly in those
relating to commercial operations."
III. NATURAL LAW AND EQUITY IN THE CASE LAW OF THE MIXED
COURTS
The Mixed Codes and other legislation could scarcely be expected to
answer all questions posed in the thousands of cases brought before the
Mixed Courts. The case law (jurisprudence) took account of such defi-
ciencies in the Mixed Codes. An example is furnished by a 1923 case
in which the Court enumerated areas of the law which were not covered
by the codes but which must have been thought of by those responsible
for the legislative acts. 7 Custom (or usage) came into the law only
through settled case law. Thus, in view of the importance of custom in
Egyptian law, case law played a significant role in the transmission of
legal principles."
The Mixed Courts were never common law courts. The basic author-
ity for their decisions came from the Mixed Codes and enacted law.
Courts should and sometimes did refuse to apply decisions of other
Mixed Courts, including decisions of the Cour d'Appel.9 However, the
notion of settled case law (jurisprudence constante) was well established.
Judge Brinton states that "[p]revious interpretations of the written law
are followed not because they make the law but because of the assump-
tion that they have been made according to the law and of the vital
11 J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 89-96. Judge Messina notes, however, that the power of the
Mixed Courts to disapprove of enactments of the Egyptian Government was both an indirect and
weak power. I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 68-69.
I5 d. at 44.
46 J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 89; 1 S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at I II et seq.
41 Id. at 34.
"1 Id. at 49-50.
"1 J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 94.
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interest of the public in seeing such an interpretation maintained."' "
The Civil Code did not refer to precedent, but in article II it invited
the judge to fill the gaps left by enacted law with principles of "natural
law" and of "rules of equity." As one of the introductory articles of the
Civil Code, article 11 was applied to all judicial operations of the Mixed
Courts."
Article 34 of the Charter and article 11 of the Civil Code represented
bold steps on the part of the creators of the system. Judge Messina
commented that "[w]ith the sure intention, which only deep experience
in relationships in real life can give, the Mixed Judiciary formulated in
its case law a notion of natural law and equity, which is not nebulous
or immutable, nor subjective or arbitrary. '"52
The case law, which developed the scope of article 11 and article 34
of the Charter and the practical and jurisprudential limitations this case
law sought to impose, is proof of the honest attempt by the Mixed
Courts to devise a way of coping with the constant problem of gaps in
the mixed law. It is important to recall that the gaps in mixed legislation
could not, because of circumstances, be filled through auxiliary legisla-
tion. The Mixed Courts were creatures of international agreements be-
tween the capitulatory powers and the Egyptian Government. Thus,
they could only expect to be governed by legislation agreed to, or at least
accepted, by all parties.
The Mixed Courts had to be inventive; evidently they did not want
to be inventive at the expense of traditional legal techniques. They had
before them a unique opportunity to administer justice through the
constant and indiscriminate use of the broadest principles; namely,
natural law and equity. But the Mixed Courts did not succumb to the
temptation. The Mixed Courts were conscious of the fact that many of
the problems involved were intensely practical and required definite,
technical, and precise answers.
There was never any doubt that article 11 would not be applied unless
"the law is silent, insufficient or obscure." In a case involving a contract
for the sale of land by one corporation to another, problems of breaches
of corporate law and sales law were discussed. The Court pushed aside
the contention that article 11 was applicable to the particular fact situa-
tion, stating that "the rules of equity can only serve as the basis of
judicial decisions when the law is silent, insufficient or unclear (Art.
0 Id.
" See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
52I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 227.
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1)."' .1 In this case the question was "only if they had acted in con-
formity with their legal right."53 In a 1925 case before the district court,
the judge refused to apply article 11 in a bankruptcy case, holding that:
The judge is authorized to rule on the basis of equity, under the
terms of Article 11 of the Mixed Civil Code, only in cases of true gaps
in the law and not in cases where equity is invoked to go beyond the
legal rules whose boundaries have been clearly, precisely and rigor-
ously established. 4
The case at hand concerned "the claims of builders and contractors to
whom the Mixed Law (C. Civ. art. 729) does not accord any privileged
rank. The Mixed case law is settled in this regard."'54 It was equally
clear that the Mixed Courts would not decide solely on the grounds of
equity when positive law on the subject existed. Thus, in a case involving
the complaint of contractors for their work (they had signed a contract
with the husband in his personal status, when the work was really to be
done for the benefit of the wife), the Court stated that "[allthough the
appellant's claim appears to be just in itself and would have merited
being upheld if the Courts could decide solely on the basis of equity,
unquestionably legally the claim cannot stand."'55
In Nungovich Egyptian Hotels Co. v. Rifki,51 a case involving
preemption and the types of property subject to that concept, the Court
held, with respect to the judge's role:
[A]lthough it is the role and duty of the judicial authority to conform
to principles of natural law and equity in case of silence, insufficiency
and lack of clarity of the law (Reg. d'Org. Jud. Art. 24 and C. Civ.
Art. 11) the judicial authority cannot make decisions on the basis of
general provisions in matters regulated by statute. To do the former
would be to create by means of case law, distinctions, exclusions, and
grounds for not taking jurisdiction for which the statutes have not
provided ...
It goes without saying that the judge cannot dismiss preemption on
the basis of extra legal considerations, however, rational and equitable
these considerations might be.5 '
52.1 Judgment of Feb. 13, 1913, 25 Bulletin de L6gislation et de Jurisprudence Egyptiennes 178
(Cour d'Appel). This reporter will be cited hereinafter as Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt.
'0 Id. at 181.
Judgment of April 21, 1925, 15 Gazette de Tribunaux Mixtes d'Egypte 170 (Trib. Civ., Alex.).
54.1 Id.
' Judgment of May 21, 1918, 30 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 433, 455 (Cour d'Appel).
" 18 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 154 (Cour d'Appel 1906). See also Judgment of June 14, 1906, 18
Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 331 (Cour d'Appel).
5-' 18 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 154 (Cour d'Appel 1906).
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In a labor accident case, Administration des Chemins de Fer v.
Hamdi,57 the plaintiff argued for the application of article 11, since
mixed law did not settle the immediate issue of the case. The court
disagreed and said "the alleged gap does not exist in Mixed Law, which
in article 212 and the articles which follow, of the Civil Code, settles
the questions of liability and compensable actions.158 The fact that the
worker in this case was not protected by the law was unfortunate, but
it did not change the applicable rules.
The substitution of foreign law for existing positive legislation of the
Mixed Courts was equally unwelcome. In another labor accident case
the Court held that it was up to the worker who alleges injury on the
job to furnish proof of fault, imputable to the employer and of such a
nature as to engage his responsibility. It commented that:
[T]hrough its settled case law [lurisprudence constante], the Court has
always decided that the Mixed Courts cannot, by means of equity,
apply principles different from those set forth in the law that governs
them, namely the provision of articles 212 and 213 of the Civil Code,
nor substitute for them principles of natural law or certain legislative
enactments on labor accidents (Judgment of March 8, 1905, 17 Bull.
Leg. Jur. Egypt. 155)."
In the field of contract law, the potential power of the judge, through
the use of article 11, to interpret the contract in such a way as to effect
fundamental changes was not utilized. In Iacchia v. The Land Bank of
Egypt," the defendant had issued bonds in 1905 and 1906 which were
bought by the plaintiff. Repayment was to be in monnaie francaise in
Egypt, London, Basel, Geneva, Amsterdam, or Brussels at the rate
prevailing in Paris. Payment was made in bank notes and in Egypt. The
basic issue was whether payment should be made in gold or in bank
notes, the prevailing form of exchange at the time of payment. Since
the contract called for payment at the rate prevailing in Paris, the fact
of inflation which reduced the real value of the bond could not be
changed. The Court commented that a contract must be interpreted in
accordance with the common intention of the parties. The Court stated:
If the judge is authorized in cases of silence, insufficiency or lack of
'7 17 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 155 (Trib. Civ., Alex. 1905).
Id. at 156.
" Egyptian Delta Light Ry. Ltd. v. Samad, 29 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 334, 335 (Cour d'Appel
1916). It is interesting to note here the express citation of previous cases and the discussion of
jurisprudence constante.
" 40 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 112 (Cour d'Appel 1927).
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clarity in the law to use principles of natural law and equity (C. Civ.
Art. 11) he is not permitted to refuse to apply the applicable law and
to shift the precise and formal terms of a contract in favor of one of
the parties, on the pretext that the performance of the conditions of
the contract has become onerous, it being understood that the contract
which binds the parties leaves no room for doubt that it was freely
consented to and does not disturb ordre public.6
The concept of a court's incapacity to reform a contract to fit its own
notions was equally valid with respect to judicial revision of law in
general. In a case involving a law which did not permit an employee of
the Mixed Courts to take part in a court auction, the Court stated that
"the Court certainly does not have the right to remake the law," al-
though it admitted that it had "a very narrow right to correct a substan-
tial error or to set aside a flagrant contradiction with the intention of
the legislator.""
Even in the absence of written law which was directly applicable, the
Mixed Courts were charged with the application of analogies to a posi-
tive rule of law whenever possible. Thus, in a case involving the structure
of a socitb anonyme the Cour d' Appel. held:
[11n the absence of any special provision on this subject, and given the
elements that come together at the creation of limited companies and
with regard to their operation, all disputes which may arise are subject
to general principles of law, as well as to the rules which have been
established on the subjects of contract and agency, from which these
elements arise directly.u
Judge Messina stated that only in cases where analogy to a specific
rule of law was impossible or insufficient could recourse be had, by an
analogy, to a general principle of law. 6' Thus, no resort would be made
to a general principle of law until the possibility of finding an analogy
to a specific legal rule had been exhausted. Only after the search for a
general principle of law had failed, was article 11 to be used. Actually,
the distinction between general principles of law and rules of natural law
and equity was often quite subtle. 5
The meaning of the terms "natural law" and "equity," in the context
of article 11 and the mixed law, had a long and slow development. The
I d. at 113-14.
*2 Judgment of May 24, 1927, 39 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 505, 507 (Cour d'Appel).
0 Ralli v. M. Tourtoulis Bey, A. Lunghis, 23 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 81, 83 (Cour d'Appel 1910).
" I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 234.
" The same rule was likely to be termed a rule of natural law in one case and a general principle
of law in another. See id. at 235-36 n.I.
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concepts regarding the use of analogies were also late in development.
It must be remembered that the judiciary of the Mixed Courts came
from diverse legal backgrounds. There was obviously a lack of a
common legal tradition. French culture had played a preponderant role
in the early stages of the legal system. The Mixed Codes themselves
were modeled after those of France. Such factors worked initially to
induce the Mixed Courts to look to French law as the major source of
rules to fill the gaps in mixed law. For example, in a case heard in 1886
involving a statute of limitations the Court held:
[T]he time limitations [prescription] of 5 years established by Article
102 responds to the time limitation of 10 or 20 years provided for by
Article 2265 of the French Civil Code, and requires, moreover,
proper title and good faith. The silence of Egyptian law on good
faith [bonne foi] must, by virtue of the article, be supplemented by
the application of fundamental principles on the subject of time
limitations."6
With time, the Mixed Courts began to limit the application of French
law. In 1898 the Cour d'Appel held that the general principle of apply-
ing French law in case of gaps applied "only in cases specifically indi-
cated by the law such as provided for by such articles of the Code
Napolon whose principles served as the basis of the Mixed Codes." 7
This attitude was carried forward in many subsequent cases which de-
clared French law inapplicable. In a 1917 case the Cour d'Appel ob-
served:
The Code in Article 292 attributed to private writings the same
evidentiary force between the parties as formal writing [actes authen-
tiques] and does not contain any provision analogous to that of Arti-
cle 1325 C. Nap.; such a provision does not rest either on principles
of law or on rules of equity, and therefore, cannot be considered to be
based on Article 1325 C. Nap.6
" Judgment of Nov. 28, 1886, 1 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 440 (Cour d'Appel).
Judgment of March 9, 1898, 10 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 186, 189 (Cour d'Appel).
Judgment of May 10, 1917, 29 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 418 (Cour d'Appel). In an interesting
decision involving succession, the Court observed:
It is arguable that this prohibition [of an agreement for succession, governed by
French law] constitutes one of these principles of natural law-universal and abso-
lute-that the judge must apply, even if law and custom are silent; in this matter that
the various legal systems-the expression of the most representative of the collective
conscience of peoples in history-dealt with in the most diverse of manners, Roman law
recognized agreements [pares] on the succession of third parties when there was also
the will of the de cujus; for the common law [droit commun] and customary law, the
prohibition was controversial and for practical purpose hardly existed; French law where
the prohibition is so much criticized by the writers [doctrine], permits this contractual
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It became clear that not only French statutes and case law but also
Moslem institutions were sources for article 11, especially with respect
to the vie sociale of the country." In a case involving a wall which was
in ruins and had to be rebuilt, the Court held that the recalcitrant owner
could not be forced to contribute to the cost of rebuilding or reinforcing
the wall which the co-owner wanted for his own benefit. Thus, the nazir
of a wakf could not order reconstruction of a structure which had fallen
into ruin. He could only order it restored to its original appearance and
only with the permission of the Cadi. The Court stated:
[T]he Egyptian Code being silent on the question of joint ownership,
the Court has the right, under the terms of Article 11 of the Civil Code
to have recourse to the principles of natural law and the rules of equity,
while also basing itself on Moslem law, applied in the country before
the creation of the Tribunaux de la Reforme for real estate disputes,
and on French law, the principal source of our Civil Code ...
i ..[U]nder the terms of both Islamic and French law joint owner-
ship is considered as a special form of joint possession resulting from
the community (see Arts. 70 and 71 of the Real Property Code of
Madri Pasha-articles 1211 and 1212 of the Ottoman Megalah-
Planiol Vol. I p. 776 No. 2503-Pothier Vol. IV p. 313).11
In matters of land law, as in questions involving preemption, Moslem
law was acknowledged as being the main source for filling the gaps. In
a 1903 case the Cour d'Appel held that in view of the vague and general
nature of the provisions of the Egyptian codes which defined the law of
property, one should deduce that the codes implicitly referred to the
constitutional law concerned with real property in Ottoman countries.
Such law did not grant real property rights to foreigners unless they
subjected themselves to the law and regulations which governed Otto-
man subjects."
In conflicts between French law and either the Mixed Codes or
Egyptian regulations, the Mixed Courts usually followed the latter.
Boulad v. Credit Foncier Egyptien72 involved the following problem:
institution in certain cases; the Mixed Law contains only one simple article on this
subject concerning sales; it is difficult to say what the rule is in Moslem Law; the German
and Swiss Codes allow this contractual institution.
' I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 238.
7, Wakfde Feu Aly Bey El Korei v. Elias El Gamayel, 35 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 330, 331 (Cour
d'Appel 1923).
71 Judgment of April 30, 1903, 15 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 264 (Cour d'Appel).
72 30 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 145 (Cour d'Appel 1968). See also Judgment of Nov. 25, 1925, 38
Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 69 (Cour d'Appel), in which the Court held: "Contrary to the provisions of
the French law applicable to bonded warehouses, Egyptian legislation does not obligate the bailee
to weigh the merchandise before it enters the warehouse."
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Against whom "should claims for expropriation be directed when a
building which is to be expropriated is in the hands of a third party
holder?'"72 The Court reviewed the case law on the subject, but came
to the conclusion that the very first case-which the subsequent ones
followed-was based on French legal rules. The Mixed Code had not
adopted these rules. The Court reasoned:
[11f one then looks at the French text and the Mixed text, the difference
in the terms employed and in the declared provisions cannot but
strengthen this conviction; it seems evident that the Egyptian legisla-
tor, who knew the French Code, had in mind a system other than that
embodied in articles 2168 and 2169 of the French Code ....
[I]t is thus not possible, in Mixed Law to refer to the French
treatises [doctrine] and case law [jurisprudence], which were dictated
by other legislative provisions."
Reliance on general mixed law rather than on a particular system of
law was proclaimed as early as 1892 when the Cour d'Appel decided
that if mixed law had not adopted a provision of the French Codes, the
rule would depend upon mixed law.74 In 1914 the Court held that in the
absence of a Mixed Code provision corresponding to that of the Code
Napolkon, "it is necessary to apply the terms of Article 1 1 of the Code
Civil and to have recourse to natural law and to the rules of equity. '7 5
Judge Messina concluded that the use by the Mixed Courts of French
statute and case law had philosophical rather than historical justifica-
tion. One reason that reference to the Code Napolion was continued
was that its provisions were truly considered to represent natural law
and equity." In a 1917 case concerning a creditor-debtor relationship
and questions of subrogation, the Court stated:
[If it is true that the Mixed Civil Code has not reproduced the provi-
sions of Article 1252 of the Code Napolon, which provided that sub-
rogation can harm the position of the creditor only if he has made no
more than part payment . . . it is no less true that this provision is
the application of a principle of natural law and equity.7
Another reason for the continued reference to the Code Napolkon was
that in the areas where it was certain that the Egyptian Legislature did
72.1 Id.
13 30 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. at 147.
1, Judgment of June 2, 1892, 4 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 308 (Cour d'Appel).
Judgment of April 3, 1914, 26 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 335 (Cour d'Appel).
I 1 S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 239.
" Curiel v. Cr6dit Foncier Egyptien, 29 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 235, 238 (Cour d'Appel 1917);
cf. Judgment of Dec. 8, 1897, 10 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 37 (Cour d'Appel).
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not want to innovate, it was "natural and logical to fill the gap, resulting
from an incomplete reproduction of the model, by using provisions in
the French Code. ' 7 As proof for this proposition, Messina quoted from
El Kerm v. El Gharby,79 a case involving a question of the matrimonial
regime with respect to property:
Since, on the basis of the judgments cited . . . it has been decided
that the Egyptian legislator, despite the terms of Article 554, which
differ from those of Article 883 [Code Napolion], did not wish to
innovate upon French law on the subject of the division of matrimonial
property, it is natural and logical, given the Mixed Code's silence on
the question of whether the matrimonial property decision can be
rescinded on the ground of lbsion, to have recourse to French law.s
Reliance on the legislation of other countries was obvious. After
mentioning natural law and equity, numerous decisions declared that
their ratio decidendi was to be found in a number of sources of legal
rules, including "general rules of law" (droit commun). In Pauillac v.
Chikaoui8" the Court held: "In the absence of a special law on the
subject, industrial property is protected in Egypt by the rules of droit
commun and attacks on such property rights give rise to an action
(against the author of such attack) for compensation for the damage
caused." 81'
Reliance on general principles of law was quite widespread. Judge
Messina pointed to other concepts which reinforced article 11 and what
it attempted to accomplish. For example, in a case involving a sales
contract where no provision of the Mixed Codes was appropriate, the
Court refused to use article 1325 of the French Code because such a
provision "which is not based either on general principles of law nor on
rules of equity could not be introduced on the basis of Article 11 ."82 By
way of contrast, general principles were used even though a provision
of the Code existed, if such principles were more consonant with the
legal relationship83 or the facts of the case. This was especially true if
the general principles were more consonant with the nature of the eco-
nomic and social interests and relationships for the protection of which
the particular rule was used.84
"a I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 239-40.
" 35 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 464 (Cour d'Appel 1923).
I d. at 466.
S1 26 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 63 (Cour d'Appel 1913).
91.1 Id.
8 Judgment of May 10, 1917, 29 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 418, 419 (Cour d'Appel).
* See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 18, 1914, 27 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 24 (Cour d'Appel).
U In Judgment of Feb. 5, 1913, 25 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 163 (Cour d'Appel), the issue was
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In many cases the Mixed Courts used their own concepts, based on
the fundamental sources of natural law and equity, to fill gaps in the
mixed law. In such cases the Mixed Courts can be said to have made
their most original contribution. Judge Brinton chose the role of article
11 in the protection of trademarks and patents as a demonstration of
the effectiveness of the article. He stated that "[f]eeling their way step
by step, the Mixed Courts gradually developed a system of protection
which, even if it lacked the completeness and precision of the written
law, responded admirably to the needs of commercial justice."' 5 In
Karkour v. Venieri,s1 which concerned a suit to stop the use of a trade-
mark of a brand of cigarette, damages and the destruction of the
offending articles were sought. The Court held:
[I]n the absence of a special law on the subject of industrial property
in Egypt such property is protected by the principles of natural law.
[Ilt is undeniable as a matter of principle that no one has the
right to enrich himself at the cost of others ....
• ..[N]umerous judgments have applied this principle . . .7
A closely related field, the protection of literary and artistic property,
gave rise to a similarly extensive case law. In Horn v. Vayssie5 the issue
was whether a newspaper article should be considered to be literary
property. The Court observed:
Whereas . . .in the absence in Egypt of a law recognizing literary
property [copyright] . . . according to the prevailing opinion, the
creation of a literary or artistic work constitutes, for the benefit of its
author, property whose basis is found in natural law and in interna-
tional law.
...Mixed case law [jurisprudence] is settled along these lines
[I]t has been decided a number of times by the Court, and in
the absence of any special law, literary and artistic property is pro-
tected and guaranteed in Egypt by Article 34 of the Charter of the
Mixed Courts.
whether a servitude stated in article 54 of the Civil Code, dealing with supply of water, included
the obligation to cede enough land to install a raising machine. The Court recognized the principle
that servitudes are restrictively interpreted. However, it pointed out that it has repeatedly held that
the article must be interpreted according to the circumstances and must respond to the interest of
agriculture in Egypt. The Court added that the law in France might well be different because the
needs are different. See I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 241.
8 J. BRINTON, supra note 4, at 95-96.
" 20 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 14 (Cour d'Appel 1907).
Id. at 15.
35 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 477 (Cour d'Appel 1923). In addition, usage de presse was utilized
to defend the theory that articles permitted to be reproduced need the authority of the newspapers
in which they were originally printed.
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• . . [Ilt is, in fact, established today, without any appreciable argu-
ment, by the writings [doctrine] and case law [jurisprudence], that a
newspaper article constitutes a property right in favor of its author.
• . .[Tihis rule, which the first judges correctly applied, is justified
by considerations of simple common sense and equity."s
In a similar type case, Mr. Zangakis, a photographer, engaged in sev-
eral suits against parties who had reproduced his photographs on post
cards. In Zangakis v. Epitimios Fr~res" the Court stated that "several
legal systems specifically grant photographs the same general protection
granted to works of art . . .(Germany, Law of 17 Jan. 1876, Grand
Duchy of Finland, Law of 17 March 1880, Norway, Law of 12 May
1877) . . ... I The Court discussed in some detail the Norwegian rule
that the photographer has the exclusive right to reproduce the photo-
graph. It then discussed the conventions between France and Belgium,
and between Switzerland and Italy, which forbade unauthorized reprod-
uctions. In France such protection was accorded only if the artist had
given his work an expressly artistic character. The Court here cited
Despagnet on Droit International Priv and French cases. It continued,
using the familiar formula:
In the absence of a special law in Egypt on literary and artistic
property such property, by application of Article 34 of the Charter of
the Mixed Courts is placed under the protection of natural law and
equity, since it is a basic principle in law that all attacks on the prop-
erty of others gives rise to an action against the author of such an
attack. 2
It should be noted that the Court did not here expressly relate its discus-
sion of various rules of law to its final pronouncement on natural law
and equity.
Questions of real property rights often called for the use of article 11.
A dispute existed over whether trees which came close to a boundary
wall and which were wholly owned by one party could be removed.
French law, the Court found, was specific in forbidding the growing of
trees within a certain distance of the boundary." However, the Court
held that:
" Id. at 478-79.
N 18 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 266 (Cour d'Appel 1906). The earlier case was Zangakis v. Fix et
David, 17 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 140 (Cour d'Appel 1905). The reasoning of the Court was similar
in this latter case.
1 18 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. at 267-68.
92 Id.
13 Judgment of Jan. 4, 1923, 14 Gazette de Tribunaux Mixtes d'Egypte 29 (Cour d'Appel).
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[Tihe Egyptian lawmaker did not think it necessary to take up this
question and it is not the function of the judicial authorities to fill this
gap in assuming the right to legislate rules regarding distances, thus
treading on the powers of the legislative, administrative, and judicial
authorities . . . .[Alt the most, one can be influenced, where the law
is silent or insufficient, by the principles of equity, which in this case,
simply mean that there is a limitation on the right of each person to
rid himself absolutely of his thing measured by the right of his neighbor
to do the same, according to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas.1'
In a case involving the liability of the state for a tortious act, where
a party received a grant of a concession to fish which was suspended
before the period specified, the issue was whether damages were pay-
able. The Court discussed the rule in French law, which declared that
fault must be proved in such a case if the state is involved. The Court
then stated that "there being in Egypt no special law on the subject the
norms of general principles must be used." 95
In a case involving the rights of a building contractor, the immediate
issue involved the debt owed the builder by the owner. The Court held
that "there is in the Mixed Law a gap with respect to the interests of
builders . . . . It [article 11] authorizes the judge, in circumstances
where equity has been violated, for example, where there has been evi-
dent enrichment at the expense of others, to apply the rules of such
equity."' "6 In a case involving the duties of a tenant the Court stated:
[T]he Egyptian code does not contain special provisions on the subject
'4 Id.; see note 2 supra. The use of quit4 by the Mixed Courts as compelling a certain result
has its counterpart in the case law of international tribunals such as the Cayuga Indians Case
(Great Britain v. United States), 6 U.N.R.I.A.A. 173 (1926) and The Diversion of Waterfrom
the Meuse Case, [1937] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70, and in the writings of publicists such as
Lauterpacht, Hudson, and de Visscher. Professor Friedmann discussed the distinction between
Roman aequitas and the English equity on the one hand as systems of judicial administration
designed to correct insufficiencies of the law, and on the other hand as the function of equity as a
principle of interpretation. Friedmann, The Uses of General Principles in the Development of
International Law, 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 279, 287 (1963). It is in the latter sense, it is assumed, that
the Mixed Courts meant to use kquitk. However, according to Professor Lawson, French law has
never known a distinction between law and equity. M. AMos & F. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO
FRENCH LAW 17 (2d ed. 1963).
" Judgment of March 9, 1898, 10 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 184, 185 (Cour d'Appel). It should be
noted that sovereign immunity was never a factor in Egypt. From the beginning, the Egyptian
Government agreed to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts. J. BRINTON, supra
note 4, at 125-34. In fact, Judge Brinton recounts that the reason for Nubar Pasha's dismissal so
soon after the organization of the Mixed Courts was that the Khedive was frightened and angry
at his having agreed to subject the Government to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts.
" Judgment of May 19, 1915, 27 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 342, 344 (Cour d'Appel).
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of fire . . . and it does not regulate, as do foreign laws, the question
of the responsibility of the tenant.
• . . [T]he question which is, on whom does the burden of proof
regarding the damage fall, is governed by general law [droit commun]
and the general principles of law.97
It should also be noted that the use by the Mixed Courts of general
principles of modern legislation was frequent, 8 as were references to
international conventions."
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Much ingenuity was needed to translate into concrete rules the broad
legislative mandate to use natural law and equity as sources of the law
for deciding particular cases. The Mixed Courts were pulled in a variety
of directions in making use of article 11. Nonetheless, one is struck by
the pragmatic approaches taken by the judges. 00 These men, who were
trained in a number of vastly different legal systems, were called upon
to decide on the content of natural law and equity with respect to
specific claims and controversies.
A number of techniques, which have been described above, were used.
In some instances the judges referred to a provision of the French Code
from which the Mixed Code provision was said to be taken and used
the rules that had grown up around the French code provision. In other
cases a rule of law of a particular national system (such as French law)
was considered to be a statement of natural law. The judges sometimes
used local customary law. In other instances one or another of the
possible comparative approaches was used. Sometimes the technique
was to compare the rules of Moslem law with those of one or more
European systems for purposes of harmonization. Other solutions were
based on the assessment by the court that a particular rule or principle
was generally recognized by European legal systems.
Settled case law (jurisprudence) and writings (doctrine) developed
regarding rules which had initially been declared on the basis of article
11. The Mixed Courts made use of these declared rules, either directly
or by analogy, when called on to apply article 11.1 °1 In certain cases
Judgment of March 9, 1893, 5 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 157 (Cour d'Appel).
For example, see the use of "generally recognized rules of international law" in the Judgment
of Feb. 24, 1926, 38 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 258 (Cour Plni~re).
" See, e.g., Judgment of March 3, 1909, 21 Bull. Leg. Jur. Egypt. 236 (Cour d'Appel) (use of
Brussels Convention of 1900 on the subject of industrial property).
"CC Judge Messina asserted that they "began by not looking in the philosophical clouds of natural
law and equity." I S. MESSINA, supra note 6, at 241.
I"1 The author was unable to trace the development of the law beyond 1930 except for the years
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legislation filled gaps in the Mixed Codes which had earlier been filled
through the use of article 11.102 Nevertheless, article II and its counter-
parts in the Charter remained available for use by the Mixed Courts in
novel situations and with respect to certain matters where it had been
considered desirable by the powers concerned not to legislate.
It is not necessary to approve of the circumstances in which the Mixed
Courts operated to appreciate the skill with which they accomplished
their work and their successful management of the anomalous legal
situation on the basis of which their jurisdiction was founded., °3 It is
clear that the Mixed Courts did not abuse the freedom of action that
was granted to them in article 11 of the Mixed Civil Code. That freedom
of action in practical terms gave the Courts the power to find the most
appropriate rule in the particular case with the world's legal systems as
their sources for that rule. 04
1938-1939 and 1947-1949. From 1947 to 1949 no case was discovered in the Bulletin de Lbgislation
et de Jurisprudence Egyptiennes in which article I I or principles of natural law or equity are
mentioned. Many cases do, however, refer to jurisprudence and doctrine in such fields as industrial
property.
"12 It was not until 1939 that an Egyptian law on trademarks was passed, and not until 1949
that the Egyptian law on patents came into effect. It is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is of
general interest to study to what extent these laws were influenced by the jurisprudence constante
in these fields. See Brinton, The Closing of the Mixed Courts of Egypt, 40 Am. J. Int'l L. 303,
311 (1950).
I Id. at 306. It is interesting to note the early interest in a European Court modeled on the
Mixed Courts evidenced in DE WIE, PROJET DE CRtATION DES TRIBUNAUX MIXTES EN EUROPE
(1936).
'" The technique of article II was preserved in the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949 which in article
I states:
I. La loi r(git toutes les mati~res auxquelles se rapporte la lettre ou l'esprit de ses
disposition.
2. A d(faut d'une disposition lgislative applicable le juge statuera d'apr~s la coutume
et :i son difaut, d'apr~s les principes du droit musulman. A d~faut de ces principes, le
juge aura recours au droit naturel et aux rigles de I'Nquit6.
